

THE  
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN

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## GENERAL REVIEWS AND SUMMARIES

## GENERAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

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The reviews and summaries of this number of the BULLETIN are intended to deal with general or theoretical psychopathology as distinguished from a special psychopathology of text-books on psychiatry. The scope of general or theoretical psychopathology can be defined, for example, by considering the content of that portion of German text-books of psychiatry termed "General Psychiatry"; and especially by that portion of general psychiatry termed the "phenomena of insanity" in Kraepelin's well known text-book (eighth and latest edition, 1 Band, Leipzig: 1909; Kraepelin's section on the phenomena of insanity occupies pp. 210-437). The latest edition of Ziehen's *Text-book of Psychiatry* (Leipzig: 1911) deals with similar topics under the heading of "General Psychopathology," subhead, "General Symptomatology" (pp. 7-224). The second and last edition of the text-book of the late Carl Wernicke (Leipzig: 1906) deals with general considerations from a peculiar angle, in what Wernicke terms a "Psychophysiological Introduction" (pp. 1-78).

Since the publication of these works, the most important systematic work in psychiatry is Aschaffenburg's *Handbuch* (I), which is one of majestic proportions, being issued at different times as the numerous authors completed their analyses. Most of this *Handbuch* fails to be of general psychological or even psychopathological interest. The following are some of the more important contributions.

Kirchhoff presents (25) in the fourth section of the general part an account, chiefly from the German point of view, of the history of psychiatry, with the main headings of the literature, including the names of Haeser, Hirsch, Pagel, Laehr. The names of psychologists are conspicuous by their absence, although the work of Max Dessoir, *Geschichte der neueren deutschen Psychologie*, is quoted. The importance of Paracelsus in the development of modern psychiatry is emphasized (compare Proksch, *Paracelsus als medizinischer Schriftsteller*). Kirchhoff calls attention to the commanding importance of Griesinger in the development of the modern psychiatric clinic, and to the breadth of Griesinger's point of view in pointing out, not only the path of research in pathological anatomy, and the path of research in clinical neurology, but also the value of psychology. Griesinger's *Lehrbuch* is stated by Kirchhoff to be founded on Reil's doctrine of the disturbances of the *Gemeingefühl*, and to unite the data of the Herbartian psychology with his own personal work with clinical and anatomical methods. The history of psychiatry has reached a point in which the stadia or *phases* of disease are to be distinguished from the *forms* of disease. At the moment, anatomical research appears to be pushed somewhat to the background by clinical methods. The modern insistence upon pathography and the interest in many works on morbid character which the general public has shown are also features of the present situation.

Gross' monograph (20) in the *Handbuch*, on the general therapy of the psychoses, contains (pp. 105-131) some account of psychotherapy. The methods of psychotherapy are divided into the direct and indirect methods in the sense of v. Schrenck-Notzing. The direct method is leveled at intellect, feelings, and will. The physician seeks directly, by means of conversation or otherwise, to influence the disorders in these several fields. The methods of hypnosis, psychoanalysis, persuasion (in the sense of Dejerine and Dubois) are considered as direct methods. Mohr (30), in Lewandowsky's *Handbuch der Neurologie*, has approved hypnotic methods especially for phobias, imperative ideas, and imperative acts. As to psychoanalysis, the value of this method in neurasthenia has been acclaimed in many quarters and attacked as violently in others. Anton and von Strümpell have gone so far as to term psychoanalysis an epidemic. Aschaffenburg believes the method is painful and often injurious to patients without securing results superior to those of other methods. Such statements as these

latter are found scattered through the German literature except in the Freudian group.

Under indirect methods, Gross deals with religion and philosophy, as well as occupational therapy and the various pleasures of living. Dejerine is quoted as believing that only an indeterminist can be a good psychotherapist. Occupational therapy is traced back to Heinroth. Note is made of the method of teaching groups of chronic patients for the purposes of successful occupational therapy. Patients are to be grouped not merely clinically and for custodial purposes, but also for pedagogical purposes. It would seem that this tendency would have a considerable scope if directed by psychologists and others interested in vocational developments.

Undoubtedly the most important section in the Aschaffenburg *Handbuch* from the standpoint of originality is the volume of Bleuler on dementia præcox (7), which he denominates the group of schizophrenias. This work should unquestionably be read by every worker interested in psychopathology, and the novel concepts, or novel definitions of older concepts, therein described under the names of *schizophrenia*, *ambivalence*, *ambitendency*, *autism*, seem to be taking hold of the literature. (Kraepelin, for example, has re-labeled in the new edition a photographic group of dementia præcox patients, "schizophrenic.") A brief account of his ideas has been presented in English by Bleuler in his address at the opening of the Henry Phipps Psychiatric Clinic in Baltimore (8). Bleuler regards his concepts as to some extent the result of a conjugation of the work of Kraepelin with that of Freud. The result will be generally regarded as far more Freudian than Kraepelinian.

The tenth section of Bleuler's work deals with the theory of the symptoms of the schizophrenic group (pp. 284-371). The schizophrenic patient keeps reality from injuring him by not allowing it to reach him. This is the process of autism; the patient ignores the world, splits it off, and escapes it in his thought. Autism for these patients has the same significance as do the walls of the cloister to the monk or the hermitage to the saint. The difference between sick and well is but quantitative. This recourse, however, is not permanently successful. In most institutional cases, the patient's wishes become fulfilled, and obstacles are taken as overcome. Of course this effect is doomed to failure unless reality is totally split off or wholly transformed. The so-called "dazed state" (*Dämmerzustand*) is an example of such a total transformation of reality, unfortunately not a lasting one. The patients are

here reacting in much the same way as do the day dreamer and the poet. If the patient does not succeed in transforming reality quite to his wishes, then it is perhaps so far transformed in fancy that the obstacles appear actual and at least subject to overcoming (delusions of persecution which transform obstacles into the machinations of other men). Not infrequently, that part of the world which lies nearest to hand is transformed, but of course not completely (in that case there would be no manifest disease), but in such ways as the so-called Ganser syndrome and hypochondriacal conditions show. The total drift of these transformations is toward an affective eudæmonism, despite the fact that this is often clouded by difficulties in thinking and by the various characteristic accessory symptoms of dementia præcox.

Bleuler regards his account as a concrete advance upon such older accounts as are in existence; for example, to regard this disease as a disorder of the highest mental function (Gross), or a disorder of apperception in the sense of Wundt (Weygandt), is to no purpose. Other authors have regarded the disease as essentially disorder of attention (Tschisch), or of the synthesis of the ego (Janet). Expressions such as "ideational weakness" (Sérieux), or "diminution of voluntary and intellectual activity," or "incapacity of mental effort," or "lowering of the mental level," are empty phrases.

The mental functions fundamentally altered in schizophrenic patients are association, affectivity, and will. Associations lose their coherence. The disease interrupts the thousand threads that lead our thoughts, and interrupts them irregularly; now a few, now many, and again the majority. The outcome of a thinking process becomes accordingly unusual and often logically fallacious; associations strike into new paths; two ideas that accidentally cohere become fused into a thought; sound associations achieve an unusual significance; two or more ideas are condensed into one. The characteristic stereotyped tendency causes the thought process to stick hanging to one idea, or causes the patient continually to return to the same idea. All degrees of ideational paucity ensue, down to monoideism. The disorder is not only one of cohesion of simultaneous ideas and partial ideas, but also a disorder in the succession of associations. There may be a pathologically augmented influx of thoughts on the one hand, and on the other a characteristic blocking (*Sperrung*). This concept of *Sperrung* is attributed by Bleuler to Kraepelin. It is to be fundamentally distinguished



from *Hemmung*, a term ordinarily translated into English by the term retardation. Retarded thought and action proceed slowly and with difficulty, as if the "psychokym were moving viscously in a system of tubes," but a system of tubes everywhere permeable. In the case of *Sperrung*, an easily mobile fluid is suddenly blocked as if a cock were shut off.

The disorder of affectivity in schizophrenia, the so-called emotional deterioration of the older books, is characterized by indifference. Above all, the unity of emotional expression is lost. There is an abnormal lability of emotions. Patients are emotionally excited if they are forced to think certain ideas such as moved them either before or at the beginning of their disease (the so-called complexes). In various ways it may be shown that the mind has not fundamentally lost its capacity to exhibit emotion. Very striking in these cases is the so-called parathymia (as, sad news met with laughter, etc.).

Ambivalence may be found in the three major divisions of mental function. Thus, there may be an affective ambivalence, when ideas are accompanied at the same time by pleasant and unpleasant ideas. There is a special ambivalence of the will, which may be termed ambitendency. Intellectual ambivalence expresses itself in numerous contradictory statements and acts, many of which have a strongly metaphysical tinge.

So much will suffice to indicate the novelties of the point of view of Bleuler. The general situation in psychopathology today seems to exhibit a fresh split between the Freudian and what may be termed the regular or conservative forces. This ingenious attempt at compromise made by the eminent psychiatrist of Zürich will go far to mend the break. Already the term schizophrenia seems to have taken a firm root in many camps; upon the analogy of schizophrenia, Kraepelin, for example, demonstrates a special form of dementia præcox characterized by peculiar speech disorder, schizophasia (26).

Psychologists must be particularly interested in the section of Aschaffenburg's *Handbuch* dealing with psychology (23). This is contributed by Isserlin, of Munich. This monograph contains 92 pages, and is not accompanied by the elaborate bibliography usually found in German works. Isserlin undertakes to say that psychiatry cannot get on with a mere knowledge of brain mechanisms. The mental series themselves have their own peculiar right to consideration, and general psychopathology is a psychological

science. The fundamental questions and concepts at the base of psychopathology are taken up, and one notes a consideration of the points of view of Külpe, Lipps, Wundt, and Wernicke. The unconscious is taken to be a brain disposition or sum of dispositions. Psychophysical parallelism is a working hypothesis uniting brain physiology with empirical psychology. The brain physiologizing of Wernicke is conceived as highly disadvantageous.

The section on methods deals, among other things, with the work on memory of G. E. Müller and a variety of experimental methods. The work of W. Stern on the psychology of individual differences is thought to possess important aspects for psychiatry. Note is made of the method described by Kraepelin of artificial mental disorder, produced, for example, by drugs, as an important auxiliary method.

The section on "Facts" deals with Wundtian points of view, but also quotes from Stumpf, Lipps, and Ach. Isserlin feels that one's fundamental viewpoint as to psychology has the greatest importance in practical questions of classification, calling attention to the theoretical differences between the motility psychosis of Wernicke and the clinical picture of catatonia as described by Kraepelin.

Special sections follow on ideation and reproduction of ideas (Wundt, Wirth), and on consciousness and attention (Külpe, Dürr).

The concept of the ego as a conglomerate is not favored by Isserlin, who would rather agree with Wundt that the combining factor is emotion, and not some process of mere association.

Some consideration is given under the heading "Thought" to the work of Marbe, and considerable space is given to Wundtian conceptions. The work of Liepmann, *Ueber Ideenflucht*, is considered of importance, with its development of the so-called super-idea (*Obervorstellung*). The mechanism here appears to be one of attention. The treatment of emotional life is again Wundtian. Some criticism is leveled at the James-Lange theory. Sections follow on the will and the individuality. No consideration is given to the Freudian contentions.

The editor of the *Handbuch*, Aschaffenburg, of Cologne, has himself contributed a section on the classification of psychoses (3). He divides the psychoses into three great groups: endogenous, exogenous, and organic. The endogenous psychoses are those that "develop out of the personality of the individual." The

externals of life dictate, not the character of the disease, but only its manner, extent, and intensity. Endogenous psychoses comprise the psychasthenic conditions (neurasthenia, hysteria, pathological affect reactions, traumatic neuroses), constitutionally psychopathic conditions (abnormal characters, obsessive psychoses, and constitutional disorder of emotions), and the constitutional psychoses, namely, manic depressive insanity and paranoia.

The exogenous psychoses are the psychoses of intoxication and exhaustion, cretinism and myxoedema, alcoholic psychoses, and drug psychoses. Organic diseases consist of the syphilitic group, a brain disease group, dementia præcox, epilepsy, and feeble-mindedness. Emphasis is laid here again upon the relatively modern distinction between the phenomena of disease as they occur in some groups and the genuine disease types.

In the same volume with Aschaffenburg's work on classification, H. Vogt, of Wiesbaden, deals with epilepsy and describes psychic features in pages 91 to 116, including several important references (41).

Aschaffenburg (2) deals with general symptomatology of the psychoses, with a somewhat novel order of consideration. After dealing briefly with the physical signs, he starts the discussion with the emotional life, passing therefrom to perception, attention, and the like, thence to consciousness, memory, ideation, intelligence and judgment, and the will. His consideration of the emotional life and its disorders includes, not merely an account of the simple feelings and affects, but conceptions of hypersensitiveness, excitability and irritability, affective anæsthesia, moral anæsthesia, autism. The *überwertige Ideen* are also considered under the heading of "Emotions." The intelligence tests are taken up under "Disorders of intelligence and judgment." Sexual perversions are classified under "Disorders of the will."

Weygandt (45) deals with idiocy and imbecility, and has presented a larger and more elaborate classification of feeble-mindedness than has hitherto been made, calling attention to numerous groups of glandular origin.

Probably next in general interest to Bleuler's volume on the schizophrenic group is Stransky's monograph on manic-depressive insanity in Aschaffenburg's *Handbuch*. This is an elaborate account in 272 pages with charts (39). According to this author, manic-depressive insanity might be termed a *Stimmungsirresein*. It is the anomaly of emotion which stands out in the symptoms,

and these affective anomalies are not essentially different from those of normal moods. In the fifteenth section on nosology, etiology, and pathogenesis, appear certain considerations of general psychological interest. Stransky regards manic-depressive insanity as representing a certain type of reaction, a disposition to certain alterations of emotional state occurring in phases either of endogenous origin or far exceeding in intensity and duration any exogenous determinants that may happen to be present. Perhaps most suggestive is the comparison of the phenomena of the disease with those of the incomplete forms of Graves' disease. Stransky believes that the vasomotor system and the thymopsyche are possibly the *locus minoris resistentiæ* for the factors, whatever they are, which produce manic-depressive psychosis. In the general sections on depressive and maniacal states respectively, mention is made of certain data of psychological interest, largely from the older literature. Reference is made to the work of Franz and Hamilton on retardation, as well as to that of Liepmann, Isserlin, and others.

Ziehen has published a tenth and revised edition of his book, *Leitfaden der Physiologischen Psychologie* (49). His standpoint of opposition to the Wundtian doctrine of apperception and his trend in the direction of the British association-psychology are well known. The fourteenth chapter deals in part with morbid feeling and thinking, and is supplied with a small but well-chosen bibliography. The subject matters dealt with are chiefly synæsthesia, hallucinations, and illusions. The importance of work on the psychology of feeble-mindedness is insisted upon. See also second edition of Ziehen's *Geisteskrankheiten des Kindesalter* (47). As to hypnosis, Ziehen states that a faint light has been thrown upon the condition by Weber's *Der Einfluss psychischer Vorgänge auf den Körper*. Ziehen devotes considerable attention to pain, calling attention to the work of Rivers and Head, as well as to the work of Head and Thompson, and Head and Holmes. On page 261, Ziehen calls attention to Mark Twain's picture of what Wernicke has termed *Überwertigkeit* in "Punch, Brothers, Punch."

During 1914, the stately *Handbuch der Neurologie* (28), edited by Lewandowsky, of Berlin, came to a conclusion with its fifth volume. There is at present no such book by many authors in any other language. Although most of the work has little direct interest for psychologists, attention may be called to a number of sections. The first volume, published in 1910, contains, for ex-



ample, a brief chapter on the physiological principles of muscle mechanics, by R. du Bois-Reymond (10), with a description of certain models of muscle and joint action; a chapter on the physiological phenomena attending mental processes, by E. Weber (44), containing a brief summary of the findings in Weber's book on the same topic published in 1910. The second part of the first volume has chapters by Henschen on central visual disturbances (22), and by Bárány on nervous disorders of the cochlear and vestibular apparatus (4); and a chapter on psychotherapy, 53 pages long, by Mohr (30), taking up systematically and somewhat fully the methods of hypnosis, waking suggestion, auto-suggestion, and other methods termed *Ablenkung*, *Überrumpfung* und *Einschüchterung*, a method by painful impressions, methods of education and persuasion, *Willenstherapie*, the therapy of occupation, constitutional treatment, psychoanalysis (here very briefly treated). The second volume, 1911, contains little of interest to the psychologist. The third volume, 1912, contains an interesting brief summary of the theory of seasickness (5), by Bárány (10 pages). The fourth volume, 1913, contains a number of systematic articles on glandular disease and its relation to neurology, among which perhaps most interesting is one by Schickele (37), of Strassburg, on the relation of the neurology of the menopause to internal secretions. The fifth and last volume, 1914, contains numerous articles upon functional diseases, including a good systematic account of occupation neuroses by Mohr (31), a monograph on psychopathies by Wilmanns (46). Wilmanns defines the psychopath in a manner following Möbius' *Ueber Entartung*, as a morbid variation of the norm, namely, an anomaly which reaches a certain intensity, psychopathic types of imbeciles, victims of moral insanity, of *Haltlosen* (Kraepelin), the hysterics, the victims of pseudologia phantastica, epileptoid degenerates, poriomaniacs, dipsomaniacs, victims of mental change at menstruation, cyclothymics, victims of constitutional lability of emotions, constitutional depressions, constitutional excitements, neurasthenics, hypochondriacs, obsessives. The article on hysteria is an elaborate one by the editor, Lewandowsky, pages 644 to 831, with over 400 chiefly modern references. The article contains an extensive discussion of the Freudian methods.

Gregor, well known for his older work on psychopathology, presents a small *Lehrbuch der psychiatrischen Diagnostik*, in 240 pages, with a removable appendix of 15 pages, suitable for practical ward work (19). The discussions in this small book are particu-

larly clear and may be recommended for a brief survey of psychiatry at the moment. The predominant trend is perhaps that of Kraepelin, but it may be noted that Ziehen's interesting distinction of properties of the attention, namely, vigility (alertness), and tenacity, is employed.

Attention may be called to the thoroughness of the extensive and very even reviewing of psychological and psychopathological work to be found in the *Referate* of the *Zeitschrift für Neurologie und Psychiatrie*. The volume for 1914 contains a report on new findings in experimental psychology and pathology (memory, association, *Aussage*), 60 pages, with 120 references, chiefly since 1908. Modern work on memory is founded on the classical work of Ebbinghaus, 1885, and Müller and Schumann, 1894, and Müller and Pilzecker, 1900, Meumann's more recent work on *Oekonomie und Technik des Gedächtnisses*, and Offner: *Das Gedächtnis*. Recent work of Bechterew in close relation to that of Pawlow has a bearing on modern work. Gregor has himself undertaken to apply the Ebbinghaus method to psychiatry. His results in paresis are given. Several pieces of work have been done with Korsakoff's psychosis, as well as with feeble-mindedness and dementia præcox. The work on associations, beginning with the presentation by Sommer in his *Lehrbuch*, followed by the extensive work of Aschaffenburg in the early volumes of Kraepelin's *Psychologische Arbeiten*, has been pursued both on academic lines and after the manner of Jung. Considerable work has been done upon associations in epilepsy as well as in dementia præcox. Systematic work on *Aussage*, for which the basis was laid by various authors, but which was most systematically carried out by Stern, has been continued by Lipmann, Chon and Gent, Aal, Lem, Heindl, and others.

Göring (18) presents a brief abstract relating to sexual crimes by mental patients, with a bibliography of 257 references, in which the names of Aschaffenburg, Boas, Garnier, Krafftburg, Leppmann, Näcke, stand out. The most extensive consideration is given to sexual crimes with children, to exhibitionism, and to the effects of alcohol.

Voss, in an article on association tests in children (42), based on a closely studied case of word blindness, believes that simple association experiments are of great service with children. Voss uses a scheme of 20 words (*Zsch. f. d. ges. Neur. u. Psych.*, Orig. 1914, 26, 340).

American readers must be particularly interested in American products in psychopathology. The *Proceedings of the American Medico-Psychological Association at its seventieth annual meeting*, held in Baltimore, Maryland, 1914, contain several papers of interest. Barker, in the annual address (6), presented the relations of internal medicine to psychiatry in a finished manner, characteristic of this writer, making brief reference to the points of view of Kraepelin, Wernicke, Ziehen, Lugaro, Jaspers, Hoch, Meyer, Knight Dunlap, Loeb, Watson, Bechterew, and others. E. Stanley Abbot attempts to answer the old question, "What is paranoia?", dealing with paranoia, however, as an entity rather than as a symptom in the sense of Ziehen. C. W. Burr (12) presents a criticism of psychoanalysis, which he states at the outset is not sympathetic. Dercum follows with a similar statement, whereupon W. A. White and Hoch bring in statements in rebuttal, which give Dr. Burr "not the slightest reason to change or alter his viewpoint." Meyer (29) gives an account of the organization of the work of the Henry Phipps Psychiatric Clinic, and Macfie Campbell (14) presents an interesting discussion of dispensary work, with its possibilities of analysis along the line of correction of mental maladjustments (in the sense of Meyer). Several other papers appear in the *Proceedings* illustrating psychopathological interest.

A translation of the work of O. Rank, of Vienna, entitled, "*Myth of the birth of the hero*" (a psychological interpretation of mythology) has appeared,—translated by Dr. F. Robbins and Dr. Smith Ely Jelliffe (34),—and does not require review here; nor does Brill's translation of Freud's *Psychopathology of every day life*, also published in New York in 1914. C. B. Burr, of Michigan, has published a *Handbook of Psychology and Mental Disease* (11), being a fourth edition,—the first published in 1898. New material in this work is comprised in the second part, entitled, Symbolism and Insanity. This chapter appears to have been inspired by the work of Freud.

Numbers of the *Psychological Clinic* contain a number of papers upon the Binet tests. In one of these Thorndike (40) discusses the significance of the Binet mental ages, asserting that there is doubt as to the significance of the Binet mental ages on account of a superior selection of children of certain ages employed in the tables presented by most workers. Other papers deal with speech defects and with delinquency.

Three somewhat striking works have been published in America

during 1914: the work of Prince, *The Unconscious*; that of Goddard on *Feeble-mindedness*; and that of Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*.<sup>1</sup> The title of Prince's book is, *The Unconscious; Fundamentals of Human Personality Normal and Abnormal* (33). The material is treated with the well-known independence of the author, who however quotes freely from Cannon, Freud, Janet, McDougall, and Pawlow. Most original from the standpoint of nomenclature are the concepts of the *co-conscious* and the so-called *neurograms*. States of co-consciousness are co-existing dissociated states of consciousness, of which the personal consciousness is not aware. Such co-conscious ideas are conscious states "not in the focus of attention but in the fringe of the content of consciousness." But co-conscious ideas are also "pathologically split off and independently acting ideas or systems of ideas such as occur in hysteria, reaching their apogee in co-conscious personalities and in automatic writings."

Prince proposes to use the term *subconscious* in a generic sense to include (a) co-conscious ideas or processes, (b) unconscious neurograms, and (c) unconscious processes. The unconscious for Prince accordingly becomes two sorts of thing: first, what he terms "conserved neurograms, or neural dispositions," second, "active functioning neurograms or neural processes."

The fifth lecture is devoted to neurograms. Prince states that it is possible that through "chemical changes left by experience in neurones, these neurones may get sensitive so as to react again to a second stimulus." Prince provides an analogy with anaphylaxis, and also quotes Brailsford Robertson's theory of memory as possessing the nature of autocatalysis. Rignano's hypothesis of nerve cells as accumulators analogous to electric accumulators, or storage batteries, is also quoted in partial support of the doctrine. The term *neurogram* is adopted for the brain residua or brain dispositions here in question after the analogy of the term *telegram* or *marconigram*. Semon's term *engramm* as used in his book *Die Mneme* in 1908 is a somewhat similar term, but used according to Prince in a broader way than the term *neurogram*. "The unconscious is the great storehouse of neurograms, which are the physiological records of our mental lives."

Some of the conclusions of Prince resemble those of Freud, although Prince does not go the whole way of regarding the imaginary fulfilments of a suppressed wish as virtually always sexual.

<sup>1</sup> A review of Healy's work by F. L. Wells appears elsewhere in this number.



Prince seems to commend the term *repression* introduced by Freud, and gives full credit to Freud for his notion of dream analysis; although he states that it must not be assumed that all dreams are determined by a subconscious process or that all are symbolical. "On the contrary, from evidence in hand there is reason to believe that some dreams have substantially the same mechanism as waking imaginations, subjected to the limitations imposed by existing dissociation of consciousness during sleep." Prince has been forced to the conclusion that a dream may be the symbolical expression of almost any thought.

Chapter 15, on the instincts, sentiments, and conflicts, levies extensively upon McDougall's social psychology. Prince quotes especially McDougall's notion of the will as a complex from the conation issuing from a particular sentiment, namely, the complexly organized sentiment of self ("self regarding sentiment"). Prince believes that the data of psychopathology show that self-consciousness is indeed a complex capable of being dissociated like any idea or sentiment, as in the quasi pathological state known as depersonalization.

Chapter 14, on the physiological manifestations of emotion, disregards the James-Lange theory of emotions as untenable and draws particularly upon the work of Pawlow and Cannon. If fear be taken as a typical emotion, then a schema of its most striking phenomena would be:

- Fear (from the mental side)
- Inhibition of thought
- Pallor of skin
- Increased perspiration
- Cardiac palpitation
- Respiratory disturbances
- Tremor
- Gastric and intestinal disturbances
- "Thrills"
- Feeling of compression in the chest
- Headache
- Nausea
- Pains
- Fatigue

The much abused concept of conflict seems to be built more or less upon the analogy of Sherrington's antagonism in certain spinal reflexes. The term *complex* is used in the general sense of any

mental experience, as in the common phase of association of ideas, and not in the restricted sense of Titchener, as the equivalent of a perception.

The ninth lecture deals with the organization of unconscious complexes or systems of neurograms. Prince posits unconscious dynamic relations which, without employment of consciousness, may become effective in exciting one idea through another, as it were, through a linking of neural dispositions. Prince follows Shand in his definitions of instincts organizing about one or more ideas to form sentiments. Prince promises a further book on the psychogenesis of multiple personality.

Goddard presents, in *Feeble-Mindedness: Its Causes and Consequences* (17), the important mass of data promised us two years before in *The Kallikak Family*. As psychologist and sociologist, Goddard has in mind the "problems" of human congregate life—crime, immorality, pauperism, alcoholism—and the burden of the book is to show how much those problems resolve into that of feeble-mindedness. That is, certain criminals, certain immoral persons, certain paupers, certain alcoholics, as well as certain other asocial persons, are not irresponsibles but incapables. Goddard estimates that from 25 per cent. to 50 per cent. of our prison population, 50 per cent. of our prostitutes, 50 per cent. of our almshouse inmates, are feeble-minded. This suggestion, looking to wide extramural application, is founded upon work with institutional cases of feeble-mindedness, tested by the Binet-Simon intelligence-tests and studied in their family relations by extensive field-work in the modern manner. The result of the investigation is to show more or less numerous feeble-minded persons in the families of about two-thirds of all cases (198 in 300) and more or less numerous neuropathic (but not feeble-minded) persons in the families of 12 per cent. more (37 persons). Goddard's calculations from his charts seem to show that feeble-mindedness is in all probability transmitted in the Mendelian manner. Accordingly, the principle of eugenic procedure is already in the hands of society, and a certain relief from the devastations of crime, immorality, pauperism, and alcoholism would only wait upon the discovery of practical measures for the application of said eugenic procedure.

Goddard speaks of his results as startling, and they evidently demand especial consideration. There are perhaps a few exceptions that might be taken; but, without entering a detailed critique, I wish to quote a number of sententious statements which will give some idea of the appealing nature of the book.

"There are all grades of responsibility, from zero to the highest. . . . Responsibility varies according to the intelligence. . . . As Binet points out, normal intelligence is a relative matter. . . . The persons who constitute our social problems are of a type that in the past and under simpler environments have seemed responsible . . . but for whom the present environment has become too complex. . . . We must measure the intelligence. Knowing the grade of intelligence we may know the degree of responsibility. Knowing the degree of responsibility, we know how to treat."

"Environment will not, of itself, enable all people to escape criminality. . . . The criminal is not born; he is made. The so-called criminal type is merely a type of feeble-mindedness. . . . Every feeble-minded person is a potential drunkard . . . is bound to be the victim of his environment. . . . The number of persons in whom alcohol has produced a weakness of the will is comparatively small. . . . It is these weak-minded, unintelligent girls (morons) who make the white slave traffic possible."

From the later sections of the book, further quotations may be made.

"A mental defect or a low degree of intelligence is a characteristic of some human stocks, and the condition is transmitted as truly and accurately as color of hair, stature or any other character. . . . When this condition exists, as it often does, in an otherwise healthy family, we call it pure feeble-mindedness. . . . Low-grade children . . . more often children of good parentage than . . . high-grade (feeble-minded) children. . . . In hereditary feeble-mindedness the children tend to have about the same grade of mentality as the parents, consequently a large proportion of the children have a mentality of from seven to ten. . . . Fifty per cent. idiots in the hereditary group is perhaps due in part to . . . accident in addition to the hereditary factor; that is, they should have been morons or high grade imbeciles but accidents at, before, or after, birth reduced them to idiocy. . . . It is probable that a larger number of cases would establish . . . a new figure for the heritability of morons (i. e., Binet age, seven to twelve), namely, 85 per cent. . . . Case 314 . . . would seem to corroborate the suggestion made by Dr. Fernald that *idiots savants* are probably not feeble-minded but cases of dementia præcox or other forms of insanity."

"There is not a single case among our children in which it can be said that the alcoholism of the mother was clearly the cause of

the feeble-mindedness of the child . . . there is no evidence that the alcohol has even lowered the grade of the child (similarly, with paternal alcoholism). . . . Alcohol causes deaths and miscarriages. . . . Some influence (produces more alcoholics in the hereditary group) than in the others. What that something is, is the lack of control characteristic of those persons that belong to families where there is hereditary feeble-mindedness. . . . In alcoholic families the average number of children is about one more than in the non-alcoholic families. . . . The number of miscarriages is practically doubled in the alcoholic group. . . . Everything seems to indicate that alcoholism is itself only a symptom, that it for the most part occurs in families where there is some form of neurotic taint, especially feeble-minded. . . . One may say without fear of dispute that more people are alcoholic because they are feeble-minded than *vice versa*."

"Feeble-minded people are not nearly so promiscuous in their sexual relations as we might at first expect. . . . The sexual instinct in these people is underdeveloped rather than overdeveloped. . . . Overdevelopment of the instinct, in many cases at least, proves . . . to be simply an excess due to lack of control."

"Neurologically, insanity results from a brain that is diseased while in the case of feeble-mindedness the brain has never attained normal development. . . . A feeble-minded person is a person with a dwarf brain, not necessarily in size it is true, but in function."

"The Binet-Simon Measuring Scale of Intelligence differentiates, fairly accurately, insanity from feeble-mindedness. . . . A child suffering from simple arrest of development goes to a certain point in the scale, then stops rather abruptly, whereas a person with a diseased brain will answer a part of the questions in a number of different years, missing some questions in all of these years. . . . This 'scattering,' as it is called, has been proved to be characteristic of epilepsy and insanity."

"Not only is there no close relationship between insanity and feeble-mindedness, but . . . these two types of abnormal mentality belong at opposite ends of the physical scale. . . . The feeble-minded person (belongs) to a strain that has not yet developed to the higher levels of intelligence . . . a more primitive form of humanity, a vigorous animal organism of low intellect but strong physique—the wild man of today. . . . The moron . . . is largely free from the marks of degeneration, . . . has many of the physical



characteristics of a more primitive stock. . . . I believe that in cases of hereditary feeble-mindedness we are dealing with a mentality upon which it is absolutely impossible to graft any kind of genius; that there is no connection between feeble-mindedness and genius. . . . In our 300 family histories totalling 11,389 individuals not a single genius has been found. . . . There is no argument against eugenical measures for fear of cutting off possible geniuses by preventing procreation in families where hereditary feeble-mindedness exists. . . . Every feeble-minded person is a potential criminal."

"There is little evidence that syphilis is a cause of feeble-mindedness. The cases are very largely in the hereditary group. . . . There is nothing in consanguinity *per se*; but given a tainted family, the mating of two members of the same family increases the liability of the defect appearing. . . . Feeble-mindedness follows the mother to a certain extent; when she is feeble-minded there are more feeble-minded children than the expectation; when she is normal the actual number agrees with the expectation. . . . There may be something approaching a sex-limited inheritance."

"In the totals of all these matings (324) the expectation would be feeble-minded 704; the actual is 708; normal expectation 352, actual 348. Such results are difficult to account for on any other basis than that feeble-mindedness is transmitted in accordance with the Mendelian formula. . . . Normal-mindedness is, or at least behaves, like a unit character; is dominant and is transmitted in accordance with the Mendelian law of inheritance. . . . Should a high-grade feeble-minded person, whose condition is ascribed to neuropathic ancestry, be allowed to marry? and secondly, should a normal person, a brother or sister it may be, of such a defective be allowed to marry? . . . In the present state of our knowledge, neither the nearest friend nor the expert can go further than to give to a person from such a family, who suffers from any of these disabilities (feeble-mindedness or neuropathic condition), more or less urgent advice that he should not marry. . . . In the case of hereditary feeble-mindedness the situation is quite different. . . . If both parents are feeble-minded all the children will be feeble-minded. It is obvious that such matings should not be allowed. . . . When one parent is duplex normal (that is, has inherited normal-mindedness from both parents) and the other feeble-minded, all the children are normal but all are capable of transmitting feeble-mindedness,—we say technically they are simplex (that is,

have inherited normal-mindedness from one parent only). . . . (This) fact that all of the children of such matings appear normal has undoubtedly contributed to the argument for such matings. . . . It is the second generation, not the first, that shows the evil effects of such matings. . . . There are three kinds of marriages open to (the children of the first filial generation). . . . First, this simplex normal person marries a feeble-minded person, then according to the Mendelian hypothesis, half of the children will be feeble-minded, half will be normal, but simplex. . . . (Secondly) he may marry a simplex normal person like himself; the result here will be the Mendelian ratio of three to one, that is, there will be three normal children to one feeble-minded; but of these three normal children only one will be duplex normal, the other two simplex and capable of transmitting the defect just as their parents did. . . . No person who knows that he is simplex in regard to intelligence should marry a person who is also simplex. . . . (Lastly) he may marry a duplex normal person; the result here will be that all of the children will be normal but half of them will be simplex; the other half being duplex. From his own standpoint, this simplex person has done the one wise thing; this is what Dr. Davenport means by insisting that weakness should marry strength."

"Among several normal children, is there no way of telling which are duplex and which are simplex? . . . In certain fowls . . . (the) duplex fowl is absolutely white while the two simplex have a few colored feathers, known technically as 'ticks.' It is a very tempting notion to conceive that human beings might manifest some 'ticks'; that a simplex normal person would not be quite as intelligent as a duplex normal person; or that the simplex person would have some physical deformity or abnormality or peculiarity which may be taken as indicating the simplex character. . . . It may be that in the future such a thing will be demonstrated."

"One thing seems fairly obvious, a person whose family is tainted with defectiveness should not take any chances by marrying into a family that is also tainted. If a man knows that he and his family are entirely free then it is a problem as to whether he will take the chance of one in two or one in four, or whatever it may be, by marrying into a tainted family. . . . (As to) the control by society of the matings of those people who have not intelligence enough to control themselves, . . . it is clear that no feeble-minded person should ever be allowed to marry or to become a parent. . . . There are two proposals: colonization, sterilization.

Colonization is efficient and does not offend any of our sentiments. . . . Sterilization, even in the form of vasectomy, . . . could not under any laws as yet passed, or any that have so far been proposed, reach any considerable percentage of defectives."

"From a study of the insanity recorded on our charts it does not appear that a person who marries into a family where there is insanity would be in any special danger of having feeble-minded children. Insanity itself may be hereditary and enough to bar such a marriage, but the question of feeble-mindedness hardly enters unless it is a thoroughly neuropathic stock. . . . Every inmate of every almshouse should be examined as to his mentality and as to his family history."

The year has been distinguished by interesting controversies between various former members of the Freudian school. No extended consideration of the Freudian doctrines can be made here.

Régis and Hesnard have published an excellent exposition for French readers of psychoanalysis (35). The first part of the work deals with the theory of psychoanalysis, after describing and defining the history of the method. Its several features are taken up under the heads of psychodynamism, pan-sexualism, morbid sexual constitution, technique, dream analysis, association, ideas, and psychology of every day life. The second part of the work deals with applications: with sundry extra-medical applications (normal psychology, art and literature, physiology, pedagogy, sociology); thereafter with the neuroses, the psychoses, therapy. Final chapters deal with a psychological and a medical criticism of the method. Freud's schema is presented in diagram on page 21. Considerable light is thrown by French translations on the various technical terms employed by Freud. The French critics state that the method of psychoanalysis is an original and autonomous psychology with various very general tendencies, which tends to nothing less than to substitute itself for classical psychology. Its adherents consider that it is a method of mental examination which is fertile enough to make headway against the idea embodied in Möbius' well-known little work on the hopelessness of all psychology (*Die Hoffnungslosigkeit aller Psychologie*). It is in fact, according to Hitschmann, a genuine metapsychology. Freud's results as to the nature of wit, its social significance, and its sexual origin, stand out. Attention is called to the development of religion by psychoanalysis. Important are the pathographic studies of reformers, saints, and criminals, with the distinction of

women into two types: the maternal type as opposed to a less evolved type in which paternal features predominate. Racial distinctions are to be brought out; the English mind is perhaps to be characterized as the result of repression; for example, Régis and Hesnard characterize many of the critics of Freud as sentimentalists. These the psychoanalysts regard as in fact manifesting resistance or sexual repression (Hoche, Foerster, K. Mendel). More scientific critique has, however, been made by various Swiss, German, and French authors. Dubois deals with the psychotherapeutic principle; Kostyleff with the value of psychoanalysis in normal psychology; Ladame has dealt with the sex question; and Janet with special questions connected with hysteria. Régis and Hesnard state that Freudian psychology has the merits and defects of a system, and recalls metaphysics. Psychoanalysis is more or less a matter of faith, and has been compared by Janet to Christian Science. Kraepelin has termed it a metapsychiatry. Considering the unconscious as something real inside the mind, psychoanalysts have perhaps returned in some measure to the faculty psychology. The French critics believe that the psychoanalysts have constructed entities where no entities exist. The Freudian doctrines of the censor, of the sexual instinct, of personal instinct, of psychoanalysis, of dream, and the like, are thus, according to these critics, inspired by the ancient doctrine of final causes. The will to be diseased (*Wille zur Krankheit, volonté de maladie*) is a doctrine of entities which perhaps do not exist. They would regard the neurosis as a means of struggling against the psychosis. Instincts, all offspring of the sexual instinct, are such entities, namely: complexes, parasitic divinities, and familiar demons whose own unquenchable fury lodges in the unconscious. The idea of the internal struggle of the instinct of the ego and the instinct of the species is an entirely mystical idea. It is found at the basis of religion. Freudism is a form of mysticism and must be judged as are those works of art to be judged which Freudism itself is ambitious to explain. Psychoanalysis is itself a symbol, and the thought of its authors reproduces the constitutional errors of the human machine, obeying as it does the eternal anthropocentric illusion and perceiving the world in its own image. It is a question whether the Freudians might not regard this type of criticism as exhibiting the same repression with which such critics as Hoche may be charged.

Freud himself, in an article on the history of the psychoanalytic



movement (16), has said that the doctrine of repression and resistance is actually to be found in Schopenhauer. The dream symbolism, Freud states, is in part to be found in the work of Scherner and in that of J. Popper.

English readers will be especially interested in the progress made by the Freudian psychology in America. The twelfth volume of the *Review of Neurology and Psychiatry* for 1914 contains, besides a number of reviews, three articles on the topic, namely: Macfie Campbell on "The mechanism of some phases of manic depressive excitement," L. Pierce Clark on "The mechanism of periodic mental depressions as shown in two cases, and the therapeutic advantages of such studies," and Ernest Jones on "The significance of the unconscious in psychopathology." A manic excitement, according to Campbell (13), may be the expression of an intense conflict in the patient's inner life. This conflict is not carried on "at the deep level where the schizophrenic tragedy is acted, but takes place on the very threshold of clear consciousness." The type of the action in such a patient can only be understood in the light of forces at the bottom of the individual character. Campbell's account seems to be understandable without any employment of the special notions of the libido employed for manic-depressive insanity by Abraham some years since.

Pierce Clark (15) believes that the mechanism of depression is to be interpreted on the basis of a severance of the activities of the libido.

Jones (24) attempts to analyze three principal current uses of the word *unconscious*. He states that the commonest use of the term *unconscious* as a synonym for non-mental begs the question by assuming that no mental processes can exist that are not accompanied by unconsciousness or unawareness. Conceptions of the Hartmann-Myers group, he terms the limbo conceptions. The third current use, Jones gives to Freud. The fundamental fact in the Freudian unconsciousness is that its very existence is the result of repression. "By this is meant that unconscious processes are of such a kind as to be incompatible with the conscious ones of a given personality." The incompatibility is in a wide sense moral. "The patient automatically refuses to acknowledge to himself their presence in his mind." The repressed mental material which we know as the unconscious is, in the second place, in an important sense dynamic. This is to say, conative. Unconscious processes may be described not inaccurately as wishes constantly striving

for gratification. The unconscious, thirdly, stands closest to the crude instincts born in us prior to their refinement by education. Without education "the individual would probably remain a selfish, impulsive, aggressive, dirty, immodest, cruel, egocentric, and conceited animal." Fourthly, the important period in life is infantile. "The splitting of the mind into conscious and unconscious regions takes place in the earliest part of childhood life," and this splitting is a result of the "conflict between the uncivilized and non-moral endowment with which we are born and the inhibiting forces that make for adjustment to the standards of society." Again, the unconscious, having a logic of its own, namely, the logic of the emotions, is from the more usual point of view, namely, that of reason, illogical. The unconscious "ignores all reasonable and logical considerations." The unconscious is predominantly sexual. "This is only what might have been expected from the fact that the unconscious is in a state of moral conflict with the standards of consciousness." Infantile sexuality is closely connected to the excretory functions. Incestuous fantasies are of normal occurrence. If Jung does not wish to regard these incestuous fantasies as real, and thinks they are "secondary products without dynamic initiative of their own," it is held by Jones that Jung's formula is dictated "by moral repugnance to a distasteful conclusion." Accordingly, the unconscious is a region of the mind, the content of which is characterized by attributes of being repressed, conative, instinctive, infantile, unreasoning, and predominantly sexual. A typical example of an unconscious mental process illustrating all of these would be the wish of a little girl that her mother might die so that she could marry her father. All psychopathological symptoms arise in the unconscious. Psychopathological symptoms are, in fact, compromise formations produced through the conflict between unconscious and conscious tendencies. People relapse from sublimation, namely, a diversion of repressed unconscious trends to permissible social aims and "regress to more primitive modes of functioning. But the process of regression is foiled to some extent by original repressing forces."

The year 1914 has been characterized by a certain tendency to the splitting up of the Freudian school, or more properly speaking to the literary reaction of an earlier splitting. Freud, in the paper quoted above, cleverly makes capital of this fact by stating that similar splits occur in all scientific movements but are usually more carefully concealed. Psychoanalysis is more sincere than other movements have been in failing to conceal its fission.

Voss and Oettli of Düsseldorf have contributed to the seventeenth volume of the *Jahresbericht über die Leistungen und Fortschritte auf der Gebiete der Neurologie und Psychiatrie* (43) a general review of psychological literature having medical interest, together with a bibliography of 629 titles, including four by Abraham, six by A. Adler, seven by Bechterew, nine by Birnstein, nine by Bleuler, five by Ferenczi, eleven by Stekel, five by Titchener, and five by Ziehen. Much attention has been attracted by Bechterew's so-called psychoreflexology. Psychoanalysis is prominent. The review of Voss and Oettli occupies 71 pages and is divided into sections dealing with general considerations, sensory and motor processes, the psychology of the child, the race, sex, and animals; the psychology of association, memory, attention, and consciousness; psychology of complex processes, suggestion, hypnosis, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis. Outstanding in these reviews, in addition to the features noted above, are, from the pathological point of view, Meumann's suggestions for improvement in the prevailing intelligence tests. The international application of the methods of Binet and Simon has shown the dependence of the intelligence of children on the social status of the parents. Seventy-five per cent. of children may be regarded as normal, 21 per cent. as subnormal, and about 4 per cent. as supranormal. Stern and Bloch have also made comparative studies with the Binet method. Marbe, in two articles, has taken up medico-legal problems, and has published a book on the subject. The critiques of Bleuler, Kronfeld, and Régis and Hesnard are especially commended.

Bleuler (9), under the title *Verhältnisblödsinn*, states that v. Gudden termed the cases in question "high-grade demented," being such persons as can live in society, get on in school, and even work in places requiring literacy, without being able to combine ideas properly, and fail in practical life. Hoche is said to call these patients "salon idiots." Bleuler describes three patients: a poet, a nature healer, and a would-be philanthropist, together with certain more complicated cases. Bleuler believes that there exist persons who fail in life and are termed demented, simply because their impulses assign tasks to their understanding for which the latter has never been developed, although it is sufficient for ordinary vital relations. Often there are habitual maniacal tendencies at the bottom of this form of mental disease. There is a great unclearness in thinking in cases so far described, although speech and conduct are well preserved. There are also forms of moral *Verhältnisblödsinn*.

The medical man is somewhat at a loss to understand why Healy (21) needs to lay stress upon individualization since the medical man with any leanings to theory whatever feels that his colleagues are, if anything, far too individual in their attitudes to patients, and far too prone to look on statisticians as a pseudological pest. The point of Healy's work and its crying necessity is not that the medical man needs to be hounded into greater individualization in his diagnosis and treatment of asocial and psychopathological cases, but that the Bench and Bar shall be excited to supplement their formulæ by greater consideration of the individual. In line with such modern thinking are those portions of Roscoe Pound's *Sociological Jurisprudence* which have as yet appeared (compare *Harvard Law Review*, 1915).

Kronfeld (27) writes upon the logical relation of criminology to psychopathology, with special relation to the so-called moral imbecile. The fundamental problem of all criminology forms a part of the still greater sociological problem; as to whether there are any laws relating to mental makeup, milieu, and the course of life. Criminology wants to get types of this relation so far as it is anti-social. Materials have now been collected to such an extent that they can hardly be digested. Kronfeld objects to a prevalent notion of ideal criminal types. Jaspers, in his *Allgemeine Psychopathologie*, has according to Kronfeld erroneously set up this notion for psychiatry. Jaspers wishes to secure psychopathological types by an inductive method. The most burning problem on the psychiatric side of criminology is that of the moral insanity of Prichard in 1835. Kronfeld points out that Prichard used the term *moral* in a much broader sense than the Germans used the word *moralisch*; using it, in fact, to cover the attitude, character, and demeanor of the individual. Moral insanity is, in one sense, an insanity of attitude. The antisociality constitutes the insanity. On account of various difficulties, Aschaffenburg (1903) and others have given up the term *moral insanity* and now might make the diagnosis: "Not insane; moral imbecile." The German conception of this situation has been built up further by Berze, Anton, and Leppmann. That subjects like those described by Prichard exist there is no manner of doubt. In the first place, these subjects are incorrigible and become recidivists. This incorrigibility, it may be said, depends upon individual predisposition. One may attempt to solve it by the anthropological route. Yet, before pursuing this route, one must separate off in practice the cases of mental



disease such as non-criminals often possess. Accordingly, one must pursue both anthropological and psychological methods in the further delimitation of the subjects of so-called moral insanity. Kronfeld accordingly wishes to rehabilitate psychological methods in the analysis of criminals by way of compensating for the tendencies brought out by Lombroso. Bleuler upheld this point of view in 1896. Bleuler supposed that there are certain functions of the cortex which in their totality lie at the basis of character and morals, and he supposed that these might be separately defective, laying the burden of proof on one who should think otherwise. Berze has attempted to divide the subjective basis of morals into a morality of feeling, a morality of understanding, and certain pseudo moral inhibitions. Kronfeld wishes to distinguish what he calls *Zeitmoral* from more *a priori* moral principles. The *Zeitmoral* depends upon all sorts of special geographical, historical, and other factors, of the particular age in which the subject lives. The structure of this special morality varies with time and progress. More important is the manner in which its facts are passed over to the individual. Social instincts are among the emotional bases of *Zeitmoral*. Education, laws, and punishments have a bearing. Egoism, response to the nutritive and sexual impulses, and the like, have a bearing on the individual's grasp of the *Zeitmoral*.

Now is it possible for separate defects in one or other of these groups of moral bases to exist and have a bearing upon the moral attitude so as to bring about moral insanity, or, as we now say, moral imbecility? Leppmann had roughly distinguished what might be called the victims of moral color blindness from those who are not entirely deficient in altruistic feelings but are a football of emotions. These types evidently need special psychological examination. Kronfeld then considers the social factors as the criterion of these psychic types, distinguishing the concept of reactivity from that of dependence upon a milieu. There will be found reactive types, and such reactive types must obviously be the particular subjects of criminal psychology. The concept of genuinely *criminal* tendencies here falls to the ground from the psychological standpoint. There are perhaps no "criminal" types but there are various psychic types which may lead to the same social attitude but do not necessarily lead thereto. There are two groups: the moral imbeciles without emotional basis, and the erethic imbeciles without inhibitions based upon the *Zeitmoral*. The two types are at bottom different also. Their effect may be

so far as it is expressed in action the same. Among the cases depending upon milieu we may distinguish, in the first place, the individual who, as a passive amorphous plastic mass, is transformed and made over constantly by every milieu and accident of milieu. Another individual, also dependent upon milieu, is plastic, not with the totality of the mind, but with special limited parts of the mental life and social attitude. These cases are cases of character anomaly and misfit, which may be pre-formed but remain latent and without result unless they are actualized by the milieu. In both instances, the effects are actual milieu effects. A third kind of milieu dependence is the possible situation that, whatever the mental basis of the subject may be, the influence of the milieu is not so enormous that it cannot be overcome by other factors. The majority of socially living men belong to this last group. They are protected by their mental constitution from sliding off into anti-social reactions.

From Bonhoeffer's clinic, Salomon (36) has presented an elaborate study of a case with agrammatism and sensory agrammatic disorder. The case had been previously described in 1909. The case is studied as to aphasic disorder under the following heads: Spontaneous speech, speech from dictation, speech from dictation of senseless syllables, Lichtheim's test of Thomas-Roux, sound images, speech from dictation of short sentences, serial speech, recognition of objects, understanding of speech, reading, writing, spelling, with ordering of letters and syllables, reading numbers and calculation, *Merkfähigkeit*, subjective account of the patient as to internal speech, apraxia tests. The discussion deals with the work of Bonhoeffer, Heilbronner, Jacobsohn, Thomas-Roux, and others. As to agrammatic disorder, the case is studied under the following heads: Forming and ordering of sentences, completion of sentences, assignment of articles to words, finding of adjectives for their nouns, declension and comparison, conjugation, pronouns, use of prepositions, repetition of difficult verbal forms, incapacity to detect false words and sentences, false syntax, answers to questions made senseless by transposition of words as if they were sensible, disorders of understanding of speech as a result of agrammatism, disorders of understanding of reading as the result of agrammatism, understanding of idioms, agrammatic manner of expression. Agrammatism is discussed in the light of v. Monakow, Bonhoeffer, Heilbronner, and especially of Pick. Further tests were made of a knowledge of foreign languages. A special musical

examination was given. Salomon believes that his case shows that the motor speech region plays an important part in the inward calling up of words. A part of the disorder found in aphasias may be explained as due to the rapid loss of auditory images and subsequent deficient motor fixation. The so-called telegraphic dispatch style of agrammatism is a phenomenon of difficulty in understanding long sentences frequently observed in motor aphasias when hearing is due to the agrammatism and is not to be regarded as a sensory agrammatic disorder. A motor aphasic who can whistle and sing simple melodies perfectly fails in the repetition of themes requiring greater motor power. Assertions to the effect that aphasics are always demented and that agrammatism is to be regarded as the result of a general intelligence disorder, are incorrect.

Stertz presents from Alzheimer's clinic in Breslau a study on so-called conduction aphasia (38). The case is less elaborately studied than that of Salomon, but the discussion is more elaborate. There is an analysis of six cases, including that of the writer, summed up under the main heads of understanding of speech, ability to speak, ability to speak on dictation, spontaneous speech, finding of words (amnestic aphasia disorder), reading and writing, understanding of reading.

Pick (32) deals with the perseveration and other mechanisms as a cause of agrammatic disorder. An interesting polemic has sprung up as to motor and sensory agrammatism, genuine agrammatism being regarded as related to Broca's area, and a secondary sort related to the temporal lobe. The mental functions of grammar and syntax are regarded by Bonhoeffer and Heilbronner as more often related to Broca's area.

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## SPECIAL REVIEWS

*The Individual Delinquent: A Text-book of Diagnosis and Prognosis for all Concerned in Understanding Offenders.* W. HEALY. Boston: Little, Brown, 1915. Pp. 830.

During some six years the author has had brought to him, largely through court sources, a great many cases of young persons, who have failed to adjust themselves socially, and have reacted along criminal lines. The book is a record of this experience.

At the risk of triteness let it be said at once that what one is to get out of the book depends much on what one brings to it. A reader who, like the reviewer, starts out four-square upon the dynamic basis on which the book is also grounded will find its chief value in the more definite formulations of the author's experience, such as the breaking down of the anthropometric criteria of criminality, the ineffectiveness of newspaper suggestion in delinquency, the necessity of the punitive concept and the like. Its psychological viewpoint is of the healthiest and there are few, if any, presentations of this viewpoint so likely to be convincing to the general reader. The references seem well chosen and well digested. The faults are those of a work which is so well done as to be very well worth doing better.

The strong outstanding feature of the volume is the conception of criminal reactions as maladjustments in much the same sense as we conceive of some mental aberrations as "maladjustments"; where the problem of scientific criminology becomes one of mental sanitation and adaptation. Much critical perception is shown in the weighting of different causative factors in delinquency. There is no special leaning to either heredity or environmental factors; some stress is laid on the appearance of individual delinquents among groups of non-delinquent siblings.

The usefulness of the book suffers most from the lack of a particular system in the data. Paragraphing, summarizing and indexing there is in plenty, but of psychological analysis very little. One must not study his cases so "individually" as to lose sight of previous experience which bears upon it, yet this is bound to happen unless there is some grouping of features or symptoms of the cases that are of value for prognosis or management. It seems that

more of this could have been given. Analysis of the material along the lines very suggestively stated by Karpas, ought to prove very helpful. Possibly the author's experience showed that it was not so, but this is not clear from the book.

The author is not blind to the fact that effective following of the cases is as necessary in scientific criminology as it is in psychiatry, though unhappily the histories must often terminate with the causative factors card and the recommendations for treatment, without affording information as to the later developments in the case. But as a matter of routine, there should surely be a space on the much quoted cards for some indication of the case's further history, positive or negative.

The author's attitude toward psychoanalysis is distinctively well-balanced. He rejects the more recondite symbolisms put forward in the school, but does not make these a rationalization for ignoring the considerable gains to be made through the more intimate personal understandings that it favors. The chapter on mental conflicts makes a very instructive presentation of cases in which the tangles, mostly of a psychosexual character, seem to produce a sort of "substitutive reaction" of delinquency.

These are the natural consequences of the false conventional attitude in the sphere of sex, and the good of overcoming this the author fully recognizes—it is indeed difficult to regard the arguments for suppression as other than rationalizations of temperamental inadequacy to deal with the topic. With most of us, unfortunately, insight into the character of these resistances does not at once do away with them. Our learned author would be more convincing with evidence for a better removal of this particular two-by-four from his own corneal surface. Compare such expressions as "not been really immoral"; "local inflammation"; "abject details of low sex practices"; "flagrant female impersonations"; "most effeminate type of sex perversions"; "even soliciting the worst sorts" (of homosexual relations). The reviewer cannot repress the thought that one should acquire more freedom in the use of the existing terminology before adding to it such dispensable words as "sexualism" and "sexualistic."

Quite noteworthy is the part which imaginations, *Einbildung*, especially of a sexual nature, appear to play in the unbalancing of his cases. Not more than the usual stress is laid upon the experiences of custody, and the *Haftpsychosen* do not seem to have come especially to his attention. The whole psychiatric section

is not up to the rest of the volume and can be much bettered in connection with some manual of the subject, such as the text-books of Rosanoff and DeFursac, or White, or for that matter, Kraepelin.

The portions on experimental psychology will repay careful reading by the laboratory investigator. The author has learned that in work which must stand the test of action one must openly face things that he who is content with the "facts, not the personality" can afford to let alone. He lays a good deal of weight on emotional factors not controlled in ordinary experimentation. He gives valuable suggestions on technique with different sorts of subjects, and on the furnishings of the laboratory. He discusses the standardization of instructions, and supplements Whipple's very just appreciation of adventitious observations during experiments. He gives a fair valuation of the Binet series—it is best below 10 and 11 but is one sided. One must keep clear of the language factor so far as possible. He quotes some special cases of linguistic ability developed out of proportion to other mental faculties, a phenomenon not confined to delinquents, and which is the foundation of Ossip-Lourié's *Verbomanie*. The experimental tests of suggestibility when positive seem to correlate well with the same quality outside. In its relation to sexuality there is some analogy between Healy's findings and the theories of Ferenczi (*Introjektion u. Uebertragung*). Tests of moral perceptions have not been of much value. A series of twenty-three tests is described in which, as might be expected, those of the choice reaction type have a dominant role. From the use that is made of them in the volume it is plain that their value depends more on personal experience with them than on familiarity with normal "results" and the technical ability to make them. Such experiments are, essentially, standard situations to which the subject's whole reaction is to be observed.

Perhaps the greatest diagnostic value of the tests proved to be for deficiencies from "bad sex habits." There are especially marked fluctuations in experimental performances, while tests that do not require enduring concentration may be done well. Improvement could be secured in these cases where the above factors could be corrected.

In all, Healy has shown that work of the kind he set out to do can be done; he has shown less of how to do it. The reviewer could tomorrow enter upon the work with a considerable access of confidence in accomplishing it but with very little additional idea



of the means and methods therefor. This must still depend upon one's unanalyzed powers. There are, perhaps, many persons drifting in and out of institutional supervision, never managing to adjust themselves to life, who might, under a highly individualized scheme of management, be guided through normally happy and not asocial lives. But this is apt to require large material resources and special intelligence in spending them, which are seldom present together. So long as the ameliorative treatment of these cases remains in the very individualized state in which Healy finds and leaves it, so long must it remain confined to those few individuals who are fortunate enough to have a Healy to prescribe, and a "high-minded and practical" good fairy to provide the changed environment for them. To do this generally as well as it can be done individually would be an intolerable burden to the state. Frankly, the state owes the most to those who serve it best, not to those who must continually be kept from injuring it. Here the balance must be struck between the degrees of freedom and innocuousness which can be had for what the state can afford to spend. For the "patient" this balance has been struck fairly, in some cases remarkably, well; for the "prisoner," very badly indeed. But a little over a century ago the situation was relatively as bad for the "insane" person as it is for the criminal today. From such foundations as are laid in this book we shall some day look upon our present dealings with the criminal as we now look upon what was, as Farrar reminds us, our management of mental diseases before the days of Chiarugi, Tuke, and Pinel.

F. L. WELLS

MCLEAN HOSPITAL

*Mental Deficiency. Amentia.* A. F. TREDGOLD. London: Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 1914. pp. xx + 491.

A new edition of the well-known text-book, first published in 1908. New sections deal with mental tests and case-taking and the new English law. The table of synonyms is interesting and suggests a classification of conditions and persons, as follows: CONDITIONS: 1, Amentia (generic term for what we in America call feeble-mindedness); 2, idiocy (low grade); 3, imbecility (medium grade); 4, morosis (high-grade, i. e., Fr., *débilité mentale* or *faiblesse d'esprit*; Ger., *Halbechwach-sinnigkeit* (?), *Schwachbefähigkeit*; or the English "feeble-mindedness" proper); 5, *simplicitas rel stupiditas rel fatuitas*; 6, *amorālia* (amentia associated with persistent

criminal or immoral conduct). PERSONS: 1, aments (generic term); 2, idiots; 3, imbeciles; 4, morons; 5, simples or stupids or fatuous; 6, amoraes.

E. E. S.

*The Meaning of Dreams.* I. H. CORIAT. Boston: Little, Brown, 1915. pp. xiv + 194.

Coriat classes Freudian dream analysis with the origin of species and organic evolution. "Everybody dreams, and every dream means something." The account is apparently pretty strictly Freudian. There is an original diagram (on Eulerian lines) picturing how a dream is made, including the "censor" active during sleep "which guards the portal going from the unconscious to the conscious, thus preventing the emergency of painful complexes from the former."

E. E. S.

*Sémiologie des Affections de Système Nerveux.* DÈJERINE. Paris: Masson, 1914. pp. xxvi + 1212.

A revision of Dèjerine's *Sémiologie* published in Bouchard's *Pathologie Générale* in 1900. Chiefly valuable to psychologists are the first two chapters on disorders of intelligence and of language. The latter is of value to psychopathologists as reasserting classical views of aphasia as against the supposed heterodoxies of P. Marie.

E. E. S.

### BOOKS RECEIVED

CANNON, W. B. *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage*. New York: Appleton, 1915. pp. xiii + 311. \$2.

BRUCE, H. A. *Sleep and Sleeplessness*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1915. pp. ix + 219. \$1.

CORIAT, I. H. *The Meaning of Dreams*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1915. pp. xiv + 194. \$1.

PUTNAM, J. J. *Human Motives*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1915. pp. xvii + 179. \$1.

WATSON, J. B. & LASHLEY, K. S. *Homing and Related Activities of Birds*. LASHLEY, K. S. *The Acquisition of Skill in Archery*. Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1915. pp. 128.

CURTIS, H. S. *The Practical Conduct of Play*. New York: Macmillan, 1915. pp. xi + 330. \$2.

## NOTES AND NEWS

THE present number of the BULLETIN, dealing with psychopathology, has been prepared under the editorial direction of Dr. E. E. Southard, of the Psychopathic Department of the Boston State Hospital.

FREDERICK M. GERLACH, A.M., has been appointed instructor in psychology and education in Colorado College, and will be in charge of the experimental work in these subjects.

DR. COLIN A. SCOTT, head of the department of education in the Boston Normal School, has been appointed professor of education in Mount Holyoke College to succeed Dr. C. C. Kohl, who has been appointed associate professor of secondary education in New York University.

The following items have been taken from the press:

THE University of Vermont has conferred the degree of doctor of letters upon Professor James R. Angell, of the University of Chicago.

DR. STEFAN WITASEK, professor at the University of Graz, has died.



